How humans make repeated choices among options with imperfectly known reward outcomes is an important problem in psychology and neuroscience. This is often studied using multi-armed bandits, which is also frequently studied in machine learning. We present data from a human stationary bandit experiment, in which we vary the average abundance and variability of reward availability (mean and variance of the reward rate distribution). Surprisingly, we find subjects significantly underestimate prior mean of reward rates - based on their self-report on their reward expectation of non-chosen arms at the end of a game. Previously, human learning in the bandit task was found to be well captured by a Bayesian ideal learning model, the Dynamic Belief Model (DBM), albeit under an incorrect generative assumption of the temporal structure - humans assume reward rates can change over time even though they are truly fixed. We find that the "pessimism bias" in the bandit task is well captured by the prior mean of DBM when fitted to human choices; but it is poorly captured by the prior mean of the Fixed Belief Model (FBM), an alternative Bayesian model that (correctly) assumes reward rates to be constants. This pessimism bias is also incompletely captured by a simple reinforcement learning model (RL) commonly used in neuroscience and psychology, in terms of fitted initial Q-values. While it seems sub-optimal, and thus mysterious, that humans have an underestimated prior reward expectation, our simulations show that an underestimated prior mean helps to maximize long-term gain, if the observer assumes volatility when reward rates are stable, and utilizes a softmax decision policy instead of the optimal one (obtainable by dynamic programming). This raises the intriguing possibility that the brain underestimates reward rates to compensate for the incorrect non-stationarity assumption in the generative model and a simplified decision policy.

How humans make repeated choices among options with imperfectly known reward outcomes is an important problem in psychology and neuroscience. This is often studied using multi-armed bandits, which is also frequently studied in machine learning. We present data from a human stationary bandit experiment, in which we vary the average abundance and variability of reward availability (mean and variance of the reward rate distribution). Surprisingly, we find subjects significantly underestimate prior mean of reward rates - based on their self-report on their reward expectation of non-chosen arms at the end of a game. Previously, human learning in the bandit task was found to be well captured by a Bayesian ideal learning model, the Dynamic Belief Model (DBM), albeit under an incorrect generative assumption of the temporal structure - humans assume reward rates can change over time even though they are truly fixed. We find that the "pessimism bias" in the bandit task is well captured by the prior mean of DBM when fitted to human choices; but it is poorly captured by the prior mean of the Fixed Belief Model (FBM), an alternative Bayesian model that (correctly) assumes reward rates to be constants. This pessimism bias is also incompletely captured by a simple reinforcement learning model (RL) commonly used in neuroscience and psychology, in terms of fitted initial Q-values. While it seems sub-optimal, and thus mysterious, that humans have an underestimated prior reward expectation, our simulations show that an underestimated prior mean helps to maximize long-term gain, if the observer assumes volatility when reward rates are stable, and utilizes a softmax decision policy instead of the optimal one (obtainable by dynamic programming). This raises the intriguing possibility that the brain underestimates reward rates to compensate for the incorrect non-stationarity assumption in the generative model and a simplified decision policy.

For AI agents to emulate human behavior, they must be able to perceive, meaningfully interpret, store, and use large amounts of information about the world, themselves, and other agents. Metacognition is a necessary component of all of these processes. In this paper, we briefly a) introduce content-centric computational cognitive (C4) modeling for next-generation AI agents; b) review the long history of developing C4 agents at RPI's LEIA (Language-Endowed Intelligent Agents) Lab; c) discuss our current work on extending LEIAs' cognitive capabilities to cognitive robotic applications developed using a neuro symbolic processing model; and d) sketch plans for future developments in this paradigm that aim to overcome underappreciated limitations of currently popular, LLM-driven methods in AI.

Thank you all for your helpful comments on our Comp Neuro paper. If the results of Figure 1 are indicative, this could further improve the results. The supervised training phase is depicted in the somewhat busy Fig. S2. While we disagree with Reviewer #2's opinion that the connection between neural regression and GPs is completely

Modern artificial intelligence systems, such as large language models, are increasingly powerful but also increasingly hard to understand. Recognizing this problem as analogous to the historical difficulties in understanding the human mind, we argue that methods developed in cognitive science can be useful for understanding large language models. We propose a framework for applying these methods based on Marr's three levels of analysis. By revisiting established cognitive science techniques relevant to each level and illustrating their potential to yield insights into the behavior and internal organization of large language models, we aim to provide a toolkit for making sense of these new kinds of minds.

This paper introduces the System 0/1/2/3 framework as an extension of dual-process theory, employing a quad-process model of cognition. Expanding upon System 1 (fast, intuitive thinking) and System 2 (slow, deliberative thinking), we incorporate System 0, which represents pre-cognitive embodied processes, and System 3, which encompasses collective intelligence and symbol emergence. We contextualize this model within Bergson's philosophy by adopting multi-scale time theory to unify the diverse temporal dynamics of cognition. System 0 emphasizes morphological computation and passive dynamics, illustrating how physical embodiment enables adaptive behavior without explicit neural processing. Systems 1 and 2 are explained from a constructive perspective, incorporating neurodynamical and AI viewpoints. In System 3, we introduce collective predictive coding to explain how societal-level adaptation and symbol emergence operate over extended timescales. This comprehensive framework ranges from rapid embodied reactions to slow-evolving collective intelligence, offering a unified perspective on cognition across multiple timescales, levels of abstraction, and forms of human intelligence. The System 0/1/2/3 model provides a novel theoretical foundation for understanding the interplay between adaptive and cognitive processes, thereby opening new avenues for research in cognitive science, AI, robotics, and collective intelligence.

Inspired by human cognition, metacognition has gained significant attention for its potential to enhance autonomy, adaptability, and robust learning in artificial agents. Yet research on Computational Metacognitive Architectures (CMAs) remains fragmented: diverse theories, terminologies, and design choices have led to disjointed developments and limited comparability across systems. Existing overviews and surveys often remain at a broad, conceptual level, making it difficult to synthesize deeper insights into the underlying algorithms and representations, and their respective success. We address this gap by performing an explorative systematic review of how CMAs model, store, remember and process their metacognitive experiences, one of Flavell's (1979) three foundational components of metacognition. Following this organizing principle, we identify 35 CMAs that feature episodic introspective data ranging from symbolic event traces to sub-symbolic arousal metrics. We consider different aspects - ranging from the underlying psychological theories to the content and structure of collected data, to the algorithms used and evaluation results - and derive a unifying perspective that allows us to compare in depth how different Computational Metacognitive Architectures (CMAs) leverage metacognitive experiences for tasks such as error diagnosis, self-repair, and goal-driven learning. Our findings highlight both the promise of metacognitive experiences - in boosting adaptability, explainability, and overall system performance - and the persistent lack of shared standards or evaluation benchmarks.

Artificial Intelligence increasingly pursues large, complex models that perform many tasks within increasingly realistic domains. How, if at all, should these developments in AI influence cognitive science? We argue that progress in AI offers timely opportunities for cognitive science to embrace experiments with increasingly naturalistic stimuli, tasks, and behaviors; and computational models that can accommodate these changes. We first review a growing body of research spanning neuroscience, cognitive science, and AI that suggests that incorporating a broader range of naturalistic experimental paradigms (and models that accommodate them) may be necessary to resolve some aspects of natural intelligence and ensure that our theories generalize. We then suggest that integrating recent progress in AI and cognitive science will enable us to engage with more naturalistic phenomena without giving up experimental control or the pursuit of theoretically grounded understanding. We offer practical guidance on how methodological practices can contribute to cumulative progress in naturalistic computational cognitive science, and illustrate a path towards building computational models that solve the real problems of natural cognition - together with a reductive understanding of the processes and principles by which they do so.

Metacognition is the concept of reasoning about an agent's own internal processes, and it has recently received renewed attention with respect to artificial intelligence (AI) and, more specifically, machine learning systems. This paper reviews a hybrid-AI approach known as "error detecting and correcting rules" (EDCR) that allows for the learning of rules to correct perceptual (e.g., neural) models. Additionally, we introduce a probabilistic framework that adds rigor to prior empirical studies, and we use this framework to prove results on necessary and sufficient conditions for metacognitive improvement, as well as limits to the approach. A set of future